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Richard A. Epstein’s The Classical Liberal Constitution is an imposing addition 
to the burgeoning body of legal scholarship that seeks to “restore” a robust 
conception of economic liberty and limited government to its rightful place at the 
center of American constitutionalism.1 Legislators and judges operating within a 
“classical liberal conception of government,” Epstein explains, would approach 
skeptically “[a]ll [regulatory] proposals that deviate from the basic common law 
protections of life, liberty, and property.”2 Classical liberal constitutional courts 
would thus renounce the toothless rational basis review of the post-New Deal 
 
 *  Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.  The author would like to thank 
the editors of the Iowa Law Review and Professor Herbert Hovenkamp for the invitation to participate 
in this exchange; and C.J. Peters and Kim Reilly for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this 
essay. 
 1. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY 
OF WE THE PEOPLE 23 (2016) (arguing that the Framers created a “republican” constitution that “views the 
natural and inalienable rights of . . . joint and sovereign individuals [as] preceding the formation of 
governments, so first comes rights and then comes government”); DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING 
LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 3 (2011) (seeking to “rehabilitate” the 
“liberty of contract doctrine” associated with Lochner v. New York, and arguing that that doctrine “was 
grounded in precedent and the venerable natural rights tradition”); David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, The 
Mainstreaming of Libertarian Constitutionalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 43 (2014) (describing 
approvingly a convergence in recent decades between “mainstream” and “libertarian,” or “classical 
liberal,” constitutional thought). 
 2. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED 
GOVERNMENT 98 (2014). 
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“progressive mindset,” and instead subject to exacting scrutiny the government’s 
“purported justifications both as to the ends [it] chooses and the means [it] uses to 
achieve them.”3 Such a recalibration of constitutional scrutiny, Epstein predicts, 
would “exert[] a profound,” and highly salutary, “effect on the size of 
government.”4 
Readers who share Epstein’s normative commitments naturally will find his 
constitutional vision compelling. But The Classical Liberal Constitution is not merely 
preaching to the choir; it is also addressed to those of us—constitutional 
progressives and conservatives alike—who do not necessarily share the author’s 
definition of individual liberty, faith in unregulated markets, or enthusiasm for 
limited government. And this large and politically heterogeneous segment of 
Epstein’s audience will just as naturally greet his constitutional vision with 
suspicion that Epstein is, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, attempting to engraft upon 
the Constitution a political and economic theory to which a majority of the country 
does not subscribe.5 
Epstein anticipates the charge and comes ready with an answer: The 
argument for classical liberal constitutionalism does not proceed from liberal 
political and economic theory (key premises of which, Epstein understands, many 
readers do not embrace); nor does it depend on the Constitution’s text or the 
original meaning of specific provisions (both of which, Epstein acknowledges, are 
often ambiguous or indeterminate).6 Rather, Epstein stakes the cogency of his 
vision to the authority of history. Indeed, the great ambition of The Classical Liberal 
Constitution lies, in large part, in Epstein’s argument that the Constitution not only 
can be read as a classical liberal document, but that it “was intended to embody 
the theory of classical liberal thought.”7 The men who convened in Philadelphia in 
the summer of 1787 were steeped in social contract and natural law theory, Epstein 
contends, and designed a constitutional framework that reflected their worldview, 
jealously protecting liberty and property against governmental encroachment.8 
This “classical view of American constitutionalism,” moreover, went on to enjoy “a 
long historical run of about 150 years,” right up until the progressive “rewriting” of 
the Constitution during the New Deal “revolution” of 1937.9 Fidelity to that 
 
 3. Id. at 310. 
 4. Id. at 311. 
 5. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of 
deciding the case “upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain”). 
 6. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 47 (noting that “many jurisdictional commands, such as those 
under the Commerce Clause, and many substantive protections, such as those in the Bill of Rights, offer 
what can only be termed open invitations to courts, and indeed everyone else, to flesh out the meaning 
of the key terms”). 
 7. Id. at 582 (emphasis added). 
 8. Id. at 4–5, 18. 
 9. Id. at 34; see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 76, 135 (2006). 
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worldview and framework, in turn, requires courts to “examine[] all legal 
interventions under a presumption of error.”10 
Legal historians will find much to critique in Epstein’s appeal to history. 
Herbert Hovenkamp, among other contributors to this forum, convincingly 
demonstrates that Epstein vastly overstates the influence of classical liberal 
thought on early American constitutional law. As Hovenkamp observes, while 
constitutional Framers such as James Madison read and admired Adam Smith and 
other leading lights of 18th-century liberalism, “[t]he economic views that 
dominated in late 18th-century America favored active government involvement 
in managing the economy,” and reflected a view of statecraft best described as 
“pre-classical.”11 There was indeed a “classical constitutional revolution,” 
Hovenkamp argues, but the “laissez faire doctrines that characterized 19th-century 
legal classicism actually came into existence 40 or more years after the Constitution 
was ratified,” in the Jacksonian campaign against special legislative privileges.12 
My object in this Response is both to extend Professor Hovenkamp’s critique 
of The Classical Liberal Constitution, and to add a significant caveat. In brief, while 
I heartily agree with Hovenkamp’s contention “that the Constitution was not 
classical in its inception,” and that classical liberal tropes of economic liberty and 
limited government gained a serious hearing only decades later,13 I believe that 
Hovenkamp in fact concedes too much. It is undoubtedly true that Jacksonian 
hostility toward certain forms of government involvement in economic 
development—for example, state-sanctioned monopolies, special tax exemptions, 
and direct public subsidies financed through municipal bonds14—helped to propel 
the constellation of 19th-century doctrinal developments15 that both Epstein and 
Hovenkamp identify with classical liberal constitutionalism.16 In my judgment, 
 
 10. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 5. 
 11. Herbert Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4, 10 (2015). 
Professor Edward Purcell’s contribution to this exchange, which was published while the present 
Response was in the late stages of the editing process, is devastating on this count, concluding after an 
exhaustive analysis of the history and historiography of the Founding era that the “classical liberal 
Constitution” that Epstein describes comes not from the worldview of the Founders, but from the 
distinctly modern “libertarian, free market views and values that he projects [onto] them.” Edward A. 
Purcell, Jr., What Changes in American Constitutional Law and What Does Not?, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 
64, 114 (2017); see id. at 89–128 (stating that Epstein approaches history in an effort to support his own 
“preconceived paradigms”); see also generally Samuel R. Olken, The Refracted Constitution: Classical 
Liberalism and the Lessons of History, 101 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 74 (2016) (disputing Epstein’s historical 
claims that the Founders embedded a classical liberal worldview into the Constitution). 
 12. Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 4. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 19–20. 
 15. These include the narrowing of the federal commerce power; the expanded application of the 
Contract Clause; the extension beyond traditional eminent domain of compensation requirements for 
private property damaged by state-sponsored economic development, and the development of 
“substantive due process.” See id. at 19–40. 
 16. Stark differences remain, of course. Epstein presumably views such developments as the 
logical extension of the classical liberal worldview of the framers, see EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 147–57 
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however, both accounts overstate the extent to which the antebellum Supreme 
Court’s heightened vigilance represents an approach to constitutionalism that we 
can accurately term “classically liberal.” First, some of those developments—most 
notably the Court’s curtailment of certain monopolies under the Contracts Clause 
and its later adoption of “substantive due process”—were more discrete and 
ambivalent with respect to state economic regulation than the term implies.17 
Second, and more significantly, the narrative of classical liberal ascendancy—of a 
judiciary vigilantly defending liberty and property against unwarranted 
governmental interference—is belied by the vast and dense web of state economic 
regulation left untouched by the handful of high-profile decisions on which 
constitutional scholars tend to focus.18 Under their traditional common law police 
powers, states and municipalities throughout the 19th century encroached on 
individual liberty and property in myriad ways, setting rates for the transportation 
of people and goods; enforcing licensing requirements for a host of occupations; 
curbing private profit by prohibiting the resale of consumer products; and 
 
(addressing the Court’s early 19th century Commerce Clause jurisprudence). Hovenkamp, on the other 
hand, argues that they reflected the belated “invention” of classical liberal constitutionalism decades 
later. See Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 52. 
 17. “Substantive due process” is discussed at length in Part II. See infra Part II. With respect to the 
Contracts Clause, Professor Hovenkamp may put too much stock in the Taney Court’s relative suspicion 
toward to state grants of monopoly and other special privileges. See Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 14–
19. Consider, for example, the Charles River Bridge case, in which the new Chief Justice famously held 
that a state charter issued to the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge fifty years earlier had not 
implied a perpetual monopoly. See generally Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of 
the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). On the one hand, that holding expressed a strong 
presumption against monopoly and in favor of economic competition; accordingly, Hovenkamp views 
the Charles River Bridge case as a quintessential symbol of classical liberal constitutionalism. 
Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 21 (“No decision symbolizes the rise of classical constitutionalism better 
than the Charles River Bridge case . . . .”). On the other hand, Taney’s opinion for the five-justice majority 
reads less like a manifesto for laissez faire constitutionalism than a forceful defense of precisely the kind 
of active, robust state regulatory authority discussed below in Part I. Because “[t]he object and end of 
all government, is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is 
established,” Taney reasoned: 
[I]t can never be assumed, that the government intended to diminish its power of 
accomplishing the end for which it was created . . . . A state ought never to be presumed 
to surrender this power; because . . . the whole community have an interest in preserving 
it undiminished . . . . While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must 
not forget, that the community also have rights; and that the happiness and well-being of 
every citizen depends on their faithful preservation. 
Charles River Bridge, 26 U.S. at 422. In this reading, Taney’s purpose in Charles River Bridge was less to 
vindicate the economic liberty of the competing proprietors than to ensure that the state retained its 
broad authority to induce new economic development projects deemed to serve the public interest.  
 18. See, e.g., supra note 17 (discussing Hovenkamp’s reading of the Charles River Bridge case); see 
also Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (invalidating the state’s 
revocation of the college’s corporate charter on the ground that the college had a vested contractual 
right in the charter); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856) (striking down a state law prohibiting 
the sale of intoxicating liquors because the law interfered with the vested property rights of sellers). 
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prescribing the times and places for buying and selling.19 Although such 
encroachments should be anathema to the classical liberal constitutionalist, 19th-
century courts consistently and emphatically upheld them against legal challenge.  
Nor was the persistence—indeed, flourishing—of a robust police power a 
mere exception, or counterpoint, to a dominant classical liberal view of statecraft. 
Rather, Epstein’s neglect of the police power underscores his more fundamental 
misunderstanding of the “basic common law protections of life, liberty and 
property.”20 The police power was itself a common law doctrine, and comprised 
the heart of a common law vision of governance in which individual rights, including 
the rights to liberty and property, were conceived not as natural, inviolable 
bulwarks against governmental intrusion, but as relative and relational, defined in 
equipoise with the authority of the state to regulate in the interest of the general 
welfare.21 In short, when we consider the common law vision of public authority 
and private rights as it was understood and practiced by 19th-century lawmakers 
and courts, the economic rights at the center of modern classical liberal revivalism 
bear little resemblance to Epstein’s citadels of negative liberty. A Constitution that 
actually embodied “the basic common law protections of life, liberty, and property” 
would look nothing like the grand charter of classical liberalism that Epstein 
describes. 
This Response proceeds in two Parts. Part I describes the extraordinary 
breadth of state police regulations throughout the 19th-century United States, the 
virtually unanimous endorsement of robust regulatory authority by courts, and the 
implications of this history for classical liberal constitutionalism’s historical 
pedigree. Part II then analyzes the rise of “substantive due process” and “liberty of 
contract,” from the Slaughterhouse Cases in 1873 up through the New Deal 
constitutional “revolution” of 1937. It argues that even during the so-called Lochner 
era—the high-water mark of classical liberal constitutionalism if there ever was 
one—the Court’s defense of economic liberty against state interference was both 
more equivocal and more discrete than modern classical liberal constitutionalists 
might wish. Moreover, to the extent that Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence 
did instantiate something resembling Epstein’s classical liberal ideal, that triumph 
was remarkably short-lived.  
I. THE POLICE POWER AND THE “BASIC COMMON LAW PROTECTIONS OF LIFE, LIBERTY, 
AND PROPERTY” 
The Classical Liberal Constitution remains curiously aloof from the actual 
history of economic regulation before the ascendency of the “progressive mindset” 
in the 1930s. In fact, generations of historians have chronicled the remarkable 
extent to which public power was thoroughly enmeshed in American economic life 
 
 19. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 
90–96 (1996). 
 20. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 98. 
 21. See infra notes 24–73 and the accompanying text; see generally NOVAK, supra note 19. 
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during the 19th century.22 Even as Jacksonian lawmakers and judges decried the 
scourge of special legislative privileges granted to favored enterprises,23 states 
remained deeply involved in economic development and regulation through the 
funding of public works, subsidizing of “private” development projects, issuing of 
corporate charters, the liberal exercise of eminent domain, and, as we shall see, 
the routine exertion of a robust and far-reaching police power.24 As Michael Les 
Benedict explained in a now-classic article, state and local governments actively 
and consistently violated the fundamental tenets of laissez-faire by “promot[ing] 
transportation development with tax abatements, debt guarantees, and public 
subscription to stock issues,” and adopting “law after law promoting and 
subsidizing economic development, regulating business practices, employment 
conditions, and labor relations.”25 
 
 22. See, e.g., OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF 
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS 1774–1861 (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 
rev. ed. 1969) (describing extensive governmental involvement in the development and direction of 
productive enterprise); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957) 
(describing an antebellum police power that was broadly accommodative of economic regulation and 
reform); HARRY N. SCHEIBER, OHIO CANAL ERA: A CASE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY, 1820–1861 
(2012) (describing the critical role of state policy in supporting and directing antebellum economic 
development). For helpful discussions of the “commonwealth” histories, see William J. Novak, The Legal 
Origins of the Modern American State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 249 (Austin Sarat, Bryant Garth, 
& Robert A. Kagan eds., 2002); and Harry N. Scheiber, Government and the Economy: Studies of the 
“Commonwealth” Policy in Nineteenth-Century America, 3 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 135 (1972). On the 19th-
century state’s active involvement in economic regulation and development, see JAMES WILLARD HURST, 
LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956), which one leading 
scholar characterizes as “from beginning to end an implicit repudiation of the notion that Americans 
adhered to laissez-faire doctrines in the 1800s.” Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-
Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIST. REV. 293, 297 n.15 
(1985).  
 23. See infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
 24. Matthew J. Lindsay, In Search of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,” 123 HARV. L. REV. F. 55, 60–
61 (2010). 
 25. Benedict, supra note 22, at 302. Federal authority, as well, penetrated social life and shaped 
economic development in myriad (if sometimes inconspicuous) ways throughout the 19th century. See 
generally BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL AUTHORITY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 13, 20 (2009) (demonstrating that “a national legal structure laid the foundation for 
integrated markets, transportation systems, and . . . the modern business corporation” in 19th-century 
America, but that modern-day “classical liberal ideology [has] effaced the crucial role played by 
government in the national development). As William Novak explains, the reality of federal governance 
through the nation’s history “bears not the slightest resemblance to ideas about American laissez-faire, 
voluntarism, or anti-statism.” William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. 
REV. 752, 760 (2008). He writes:  
From the founding of the first national governing institutions to the conquest of western 
lands; from the creation of a vast public infrastructure for the promotion of commerce to 
the construction of a powerful defense and military establishment; from the expansion of 
governmental powers of police, regulation, administration, and redistribution to the 
invention of new ways of policing citizens, aliens, races, morals, and gender relations in 
the production of national culture, the infrastructural power of the American state seems 
at times boundless, even borderless, as American legal, corporate, economic, and cultural 
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Although the police power has never lent itself to easy definition, the 1851 
case of Commonwealth v. Alger serves as an important touchstone.26 The case 
pitted the rights of riparian landowner Curtis Alger to construct a wharf on his 
Boston Harbor property against “the just powers of the legislature to limit, control, 
or regulate the exercise . . . of [those] rights.”27 The court’s opinion upholding the 
challenged regulation was written by Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, the 
leading common law jurist of the era.28 Chief Justice Shaw’s description of the state 
police power is particularly illuminating with respect to the “common law 
protections of life, liberty and property” that, in Epstein’s view, served as the 
fundamental measure of individual rights during the 150-year heyday of classical 
liberal constitutionalism.29 “All property in this commonwealth,” Shaw explained, 
“is derived directly or indirectly from the government, and held subject to those 
general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general 
welfare.”30 By virtue of the state’s “dominion and sovereignty” over its lands, he 
continued, “[r]ights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are 
subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment . . . as the legislature . . . 
may think necessary and expedient.”31 These are not the property rights of classical 
liberal lore—natural, pre-social rights protected against all but the most essential 
governmental encroachment by a strong judicial “presumption of error.” To the 
contrary, Alger’s “vested interest in the soil”—a fee simple absolute, in the 
language of the common law—was a “social and conventional right[],” the meaning 
and scope of which were necessarily fluid and relative, subject to evolving 
legislative conceptions of the “common good” and of regulatory expediency.32  
Nor was the relative nature of individual rights confined to the maintenance 
of public waterways and other public resources. The “police power,” Shaw 
explained, was “vested in the legislature . . . [to] establish all manner of wholesome 
and reasonable laws . . . as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the 
commonwealth.”33 Indeed, neither the result in Alger nor the terms in which Shaw 
addressed “the relative rights of the public and of individual proprietors” were 
unusual.34 Chief Justice Shaw was merely giving expression to a broadly shared legal 
 
forms spread across the globe. It is this power—infrastructural power—that renders 
commentary about American state weakness or statelessness unintelligible. 
Id. at 763. 
 26. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851). 
 27. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 65. 
 28. Id. On Shaw’s extraordinary stature and influence, see Leonard Levy, Lemuel Shaw: America’s 
“Greatest Magistrate,” 7 VILL. L. REV. 389 (arguing that “no other state judge through his opinions had 
so great an influence on the course of American law”). 
 29. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 98. 
 30. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 85. 
 31. Id. at 84–85. 
 32. Id. at 71, 85. 
 33. Id. at 85. 
 34. Id. at 64. 
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worldview that, as historian William Novak writes, “fostered and legitimated the 
pervasive role of police and regulation in early American economy and society: the 
common law vision of a well-regulated society.”35 Within that vision, Novak 
explains, rights operated not as “absolute shields . . . protecting individuals from 
society and government,”36 but rather were “guaranteed actively and relatively in 
an ongoing calculation of the reciprocal rights and duties of others and the good of 
the whole in a constantly changing society.”37  
Although the police power restricted economic liberty and private property in 
myriad and profound ways, it was not boundless. Contrary to Epstein’s assertion, 
however, the limits of that power generally were not enforced by state courts’ 
“solicitude for the rights of life, liberty, and property that lay at the core of the 
natural rights tradition.”38 Rather, they were defined by the constitutive terms of 
the police power itself—specifically, the requirement that regulation serve the 
common good and general welfare of the commonwealth. In this way, the “public 
health, morals and welfare” constituted a finite universe of the police power’s 
legitimate ends. When evaluating the legal permissibility of a particular regulation, 
writes political scientist Howard Gillman, “[t]he issue in contention . . . was not the 
importance of the liberty but the character of the legislation: did it actually promote 
the good of the public or was it designed to promote the special interests of some 
favored groups?”39  
Within those broad limits, economic regulation routinely extended far beyond 
the discrete, targeted interventions that might be compatible with the classical 
liberal night-watchman state, such as controlling monopoly, regulating noxious 
trades, abating fire hazards and other public nuisances, and preventing the spread 
of infectious disease. As Professor Hovenkamp observes, states and municipalities 
enacted hundreds of statutes and ordinances policing public morals, commonly 
targeting such evils as drunkenness, prostitution, gambling, vagrancy, profanity, 
adultery, fornication, obscenity, and the like.40 Perhaps more importantly for our 
purposes, however, they also aggressively and conspicuously limited precisely the 
kinds of “private” economic enterprise for which some Lochner-era jurists and 
modern classical liberals would later seek constitutional protection. States and 
municipalities established strict licensing requirements for a broad range of 
commercial activities, including the mere trading or selling of otherwise lawful 
goods. Under Maryland law, for example, it was unlawful to “expose for sale, or 
 
 35. NOVAK, supra note 19, at 26. 
 36. Id. at 34. 
 37. Id. at 36. 
 38. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 13. 
 39. Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise 
of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 POL. RES. Q. 623, 633–34 (1994) (emphasis in original). 
 40. Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 5. Some regulations were more far-reaching. Connecticut’s 
criminal code, for example, included proscriptions on “any games, tricks, plays, shows, tumbling, rope 
dancing, puppet shows, or feats of uncommon dexterity or agility of body.” 1830 Conn. Pub. Acts 275 
(quoted in NOVAK, supra note 19, at 155). 
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sell, any goods, wares or merchandise, with a view to profit in the way of trade” 
without first obtaining a “license to trade.”41 State legislatures also controlled the 
prices of consumer goods, and reigned in what they considered excessive profits 
by proscribing the resale of various goods for gain.42 And municipalities extensively 
regulated the times and places in which ordinary commodities could be sold.43 Such 
examples not only testify to the pervasive regulation of market exchange 
throughout the supposed heyday of classical liberal constitutionalism; they belie 
the basic classical liberal separation of private economy and public authority into 
distinct spheres. 
Moreover, state courts upheld the vast majority of such regulations on the 
basis of municipal corporations’ far-reaching authority to circumscribe private 
economic transactions in the service of the public good. Consider the leading case 
of Village of Buffalo v. Webster, decided by the New York Supreme Court of 
Judicature in 1833.44 The defendant, a farmer, had been convicted of violating a 
municipal ordinance prohibiting “the hawking of meats about the streets of the 
village.”45 Webster’s crime consisted of exchanging a leg of lamb with a local grocer 
for a pound of tea, outside of the market district defined in the ordinance.46 
Webster argued on appeal that “[to] require [a] farmer and [a] grocer [to] march 
off to the prescribed bounds, and there make their contract for the exchange of 
the meat for the tea, and then formally return to the shop of the grocer and perfect 
the contract by the delivery of the articles,” amounted to an “unreasonable and 
improper[] restrain[t] [of] trade.”47 
The court’s brief opinion upholding Webster’s conviction captures the breadth 
of public authority in Jacksonian New York. “At common law,” the court began, 
municipal corporations such as Buffalo had the power to “make by-laws, for the 
general good” so long as they “be reasonable and for the common benefit,” and do 
not “restrain[] . . . trade, nor impose a burden without an apparent benefit.”48 The 
challenged ordinance easily satisfied those modest conditions.49 The court drew a 
sharp distinction between the restraint of trade, which was prohibited at common 
law, and its mere regulation, which was permitted.50 “[A] by-law that no meat 
should be sold in the village would be bad, being a general restraint,” the court 
explained; however, a law “imposing particular restraints as to [the] time and 
place” that meat may be sold was not “a restraint of the right to sell meat, but a 
 
 41. 1827 Md. Laws 1085 (quoted in NOVAK, supra note 19, at 91). 
 42. NOVAK, supra note 19, at 94.  
 43. Id. at 95–99. 
 44. See generally Vill. of Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. 99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833). 
 45. Id. at 100. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 101. 
 49. Id. at 102. 
 50. Vill. of Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. 99, 101–02 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833). 
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regulation of that right.”51 A mere regulation of trade, even a particularly 
inconvenient regulation that encumbered commerce, did not constitute an 
impermissible restraint. The court likewise affirmed without comment that the 
burden imposed by the regulation carried a “correspondent benefit,” and that the 
regulation was “reasonable in itself, and promotive of the public good.”52 
Consider also In re Nightingale, decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in 1831.53 The defendant, a farmer, had been convicted of violating 
a Boston ordinance forbidding an inhabitant of Boston or any town “in the vicinity 
thereof” from “vending commodities” that were not “the produce of his own farm, 
or of some farm in his neighbourhood,” at Faneuil Hall market or on two adjacent 
streets, without first obtaining permission from the official market clerk.54 Such 
prohibitions on the resale of consumer goods at public markets were common 
during the antebellum era,55 and were modeled after English statutes and 
traditional common law offenses intended to prevent the unjust inflation of 
consumer prices by various forms of profiteering.56 Nightingale’s crime consisted 
of selling, in addition to the “produce of his own farm,” lambs that he had bought 
the previous week and “carcasses of sheep . . . bought some months before.”57 On 
appeal, Nightingale argued that the ordinance was invalid on two distinct grounds: 
First, it was “partial and did not operate on all the citizens of the commonwealth 
equally” because it distinguished between “the inhabitants of Boston and its 
vicinity, and the inhabitants of distant towns in the commonwealth.”58 Second, the 
ordinance was void for “uncertainty” because it failed to identify the specific towns 
contemplated to be within “‘the vicinity’ of Boston,” and thus lodged excessive 
discretion in the market clerk to order the removal of unauthorized sellers from the 
market.59 
 
 51. Id. at 101 (emphasis in original). 
 52. Id. at 102. 
 53. In re Nightingale, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 168 (1831). 
 54. Id. at 171.  
 55. See NOVAK, supra note 19, at 94–95. 
 56. Such “offenses against public trade” included “forestalling,” “regrating,” and “engrossing.” 
According to William Blackstone’s widely cited definitions, forestalling was “the buying or contracting 
for any merchandize or victual coming in the way to market; or disuading [sic] persons from bringing 
their goods or provisions there; or persuading them to enhance the price, when there: any of which 
practices make the market dearer to the fair trader.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND 160 (10th ed. 1787). Regrating was “the buying of corn, or other dead victual, in any market, 
and selling them again in the same market, or within four miles of the place. For this also enhances the 
price of the provisions, as every successive seller must have a successive profit.” Id. Engrossing was “the 
getting into one’s possession, or buying up, large quantities of corn or other dead victuals, with intent 
to sell them again. This must of course be injurious to the public, by putting it in the power or one or 
two rich men to raise the price of provisions at their own discretion.” Id. 
 57. Nightingale, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) at 171. 
 58. Id. at 171 (emphasis added). 
 59. In re Nightingale, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 168, 171–72 (1831). 
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The court soundly rejected each of these arguments: “[T]he partial operation 
of the ordinance can be no objection to its validity,” the court explained, “provided 
it does not infringe private rights; and it is very clear that it does not.”60 Because 
“[t]he city government had an undoubted right to prohibit the occupation of a 
stand in the streets by any one,” it reasoned, there was “certainly nothing 
contained in the ordinance . . . which can be pretended to operate as a violation of 
private rights; nor does it operate as an improper restraint on trade, but is a 
wholesome regulation of it, to prevent the market from being unnecessarily 
thronged and incumbered [sic].”61 Neither was the ordinance “void for 
uncertainty.” Although the term “vicinity” was “somewhat indefinite,” the court 
acknowledged, the question of whether the defendant lived “in the vicinity” of 
Boston was “properly left [for] the jury.”62 If Nightingale had been fined for the 
“mere occupation” of the stand in question, the court acknowledged, the objection 
might carry more weight.63 But he incurred a penalty only after refusing to vacate 
the stand when he was ordered to do so.64 In these cases and many others, state 
courts upheld the authority of municipalities at common law and under their 
charters to interject public power into the most mundane of private commercial 
transactions—in Webster, the exchange of meat and tea at a location that was 
mutually convenient to the parties; in Nightingale, the resale of consumer goods 
for profit.  
To be sure, Jacksonian courts and legislatures did limit the police power in 
meaningful ways. Judges were prepared to void legislation that violated vested 
property rights;65 and legislators adopted myriad statutes and constitutional 
provisions prohibiting the granting of special privileges.66 Because such official 
hostility toward legislative overreaching was often couched in an idiom of laissez 
faire, later-day libertarians are sometimes inclined to read into pre-Civil War 
jurisprudence constitutional economic rights that appeared only decades later. The 
cases discussed above illustrate two critical counterpoints to that inclination: First, 
both regulators and reviewing courts understood and applied the police power as 
a fundamental, far-reaching, and uncontroversial form of public authority—a 
conception of governance that is difficult to reconcile with the classical liberal 
worldview that Epstein ascribes to the period. Second, and perhaps even more 
importantly, even during the supposed acme of laissez faire constitutionalism 
before the Civil War, an individual “right” was not, as Epstein imagines it, an 
 
 60. Id. at 173–74. 
 61. Id. at 174. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 174–75. 
 65. See Benedict, supra note 22, at 324–25 (describing judicial disapproval of “retrospective 
legislation” that disturbed vested rights in property). 
 66. See id. at 322 (discussing the adoption of various state constitutional prohibitions on the 
granting of special legislative privileges, including the commitment of public funds, loans, or credit 
pledges in support of private enterprise).  
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autonomous sphere of liberty and property into which the state could not intrude. 
Rather, a “right” served as a guarantee that the state could only interfere with 
one’s liberty or property through general laws that were reasonably adapted to 
serve a public purpose. Consider, again, Nightingale: It was precisely because the 
City of Boston had the “undoubted right” to prohibit the reselling of consumer 
goods at the public market that there was “certainly nothing contained in the 
ordinance . . . which can be pretended to operate as a violation of private rights.”67 
Here, the Massachusetts court’s basic understanding of an individual “right” stands 
in sharp contrast to the modern conception of individual “rights” as inviolable, or 
at least “fundamental.” From the nation’s Founding until the beginning of the 20th 
century, explains Gillman, judges protected liberty primarily by asking “whether a 
law actually promoted a valid public purpose rather than whether a law violated an 
important liberty.”68 In other words, “the nature of the legislative power prohibited 
legislatures from interfering with people’s liberty or property unless such 
interference was necessary to advance the general welfare of the community as a 
whole.”69 
This meant that judges were on the lookout not for intrusions of public power 
into a sphere of private liberty, but for “laws that appeared to advance only the 
narrow interests of certain classes, or that had no discernible impact on public 
health, safety, or morality.”70 Such partial laws, or “class legislation,” as they were 
later termed, “could be struck down as corrupt, arbitrary, and outside the scope of 
the police powers.”71 Some antebellum courts did begin to import “substantive” 
protection of liberty and property into their state due process (or “law of the land”) 
provisions. Critically, however, that substance consisted not in a freedom to 
exercise one’s private commercial prerogatives, but in protection against “special 
legislation [that] transferred property from one person to another without due 
process of law.”72 This is precisely why the Webster court emphasized that the 
challenged market regulation was a “general” one that was “reasonable and for the 
common benefit.”73 In a “regime of limited government powers” like the 
antebellum United States, Gillman pointedly notes, “the rights and liberties of the 
citizens are protected residually: on this view, freedom is what is left over after 
 
 67. In re Nightingale, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 168, 174 (1831). 
 68. Gillman, supra note 39, at 624. 
 69. Id. at 629. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 629–30. 
 72. Benedict, supra note 22, at 325. “[A]ntebellum American law was suffused with the principle 
that special legislation was illegitimate,” Benedict explains, and as early as 1819 attorneys and courts 
had begun to link that conviction “to the fundamental maxim that no person could be deprived of 
property but by due process or law or by the laws of the land.” Id. at 326. As Ryan Williams explains, by 
the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, the phrase “due process of law” already “had 
developed . . . well-established substantive connotations as both a prohibition of legislative interference 
with vested rights and as a guarantee of general and impartial laws.” Ryan C. Williams, The One and 
Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 416 (2010).  
 73. Vill. of Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. 100, 101 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833). 
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government has reached the limits of its authorized power.”74 It was only much 
later, in the 20th century, that state and federal courts developed a jurisprudence 
of “fundamental” rights, or “preferred freedoms,” the interference with which 
triggered heightened judicial scrutiny.75 
This was the common-law vision of statecraft that prevailed in the United 
States throughout the antebellum era, and it does not at all reflect “the classical 
liberal position that all state action should be examined under a presumption of 
error.”76 Indeed, the municipal officials, state legislators, and common law judges 
who executed that vision would not have recognized the modern “fundamental 
rights” framework that Epstein anachronistically projects onto them. Accordingly, 
the defendants in Webster and Nightingale—men whose freedom to engage in 
remarkably ordinary commercial transactions was significantly encumbered—did 
not even challenge the ordinances under the due process clauses (or other liberty-
protecting provisions) of their state constitutions.77 Why would sophisticated and 
resourceful attorneys arguing before judges who supposedly were steeped in 
classical liberal constitutionalism and thus primed to approach every interference 
with individual liberty and property under a presumption of error, neglect to argue 
that the enforcement of the ordinances had violated their clients’ constitutional 
rights? The answer is that they wouldn’t.  
II. CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND “LIBERTY OF CONTRACT” 
Part I argued that the historical pedigree for classical liberal constitutionalism 
is remarkably weak, and that the “long historical run of about 150 years” that 
Epstein claims for the classical view was nothing of the sort.78 But what about the 
Lochner era79—the decades preceding the New Deal “revolution” in constitutional 
law, when, as every law student learns, courts imposed a host of new, or at least 
newly robust, constraints on the authority of both the state and federal 
governments to regulate private commercial transactions? Although the Lochner 
era and its conceptual centerpiece, “liberty of contract,” have long been derided 
by legal liberals and conservatives alike as ideologically motivated judicial 
 
 74. Gillman, supra note 39, at 625. 
 75. Id. at 624–25. 
 76. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 304. 
 77. Rather, their facial challenges to the ordinances centered on the allegation that the laws were 
“partial” (and therefore invalid) because they benefited some narrow class of persons rather than the 
general public. They also raised “as applied” challenges. For example, Webster argued that the time-
and-place regulation was intended to prevent only the “hawking of meats about the streets of the 
village,” and not to apply to in-kind trades of the sort for which Webster had been prosecuted. See 
Webster, 10 Wend. at 100. Nightingale argued that he had not violated the prohibition of reselling 
because “a large portion, perhaps half in value, of the articles in his wagon were the produce of his own 
farm.” In re Nightingale, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 168, 172 (1831). 
 78. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 34. 
 79. The term comes from the Supreme Court’s famous decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45 (1905), striking down a maximum hours law for bakers as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
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activism,80 a host of recent works by libertarian-leaning legal scholars—with such 
titles as Rehabilitating Lochner and Liberty of Contract: Rediscovering a Lost 
Constitutional Right—have sought to rescue constitutional economic liberty from 
disrepute.81 Even if Epstein misattributes a classical liberal worldview to the 
Constitution’s Framers and seriously exaggerates the influence of classical 
liberalism in the pre-Civil War period, one might nevertheless argue that the 
decades preceding the New Deal constitutional “revolution” provide a sound, if 
substantially narrower, historical foundation for Epstein’s theory of constitutional 
interpretation. 
This Part has three primary goals: First, it explains that the species of 
constitutional economic liberty that Epstein mistakenly ascribes to the period 
between the nation’s founding and the Civil War—a liberty against governmental 
meddling, the interference with which triggers exacting scrutiny—was instead 
developed in the decades following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Second, it demonstrates that even during the Lochner era—the supposed high-
water mark of laissez faire constitutionalism—”liberty of contract” constrained 
economic regulation in much more discrete ways than is commonly supposed. 
Finally, it argues that if we take the long view, the brief ascendancy of constitutional 
economic liberty during the first three decades of the 20th century is most usefully 
understood not as the belated fulfillment of a classical liberal worldview woven 
into the constitutional fabric a century earlier, but rather as a contentious, 
uncertain, and somewhat muddled process of regulatory and constitutional 
adaptation, in which the Court worked out how to apply the long-standing common 
law prohibition against special legislative privileges in a modern industrial setting.82  
 
 80. Lochner, in particular, continues to occupy a central place in the debate over the proper scope 
of judicial review. During the litigation over the Affordable Care Act, for example, both President Obama 
and Solicitor General Donald Verilli invoked Lochner as a caution to the Court against abandoning judicial 
restraint. See Matthew J. Lindsay, Federalism and Phantom Economic Rights in NFIB v. Sebelius, 82 U. 
CINCINNATI L. REV. 687, 691 n.12 (2014). Prominent conservatives, including Robert Bork and Chief Justice 
John Roberts, have also publicly denounced Lochner as a “judicial usurpation” of legislative power. See 
id. On the use and abuse of Lochner in modern constitutional discourse, see Gary D. Rowe, Lochner 
Revisionism Revisited, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 221, 223 (1999) (describing the “ghost of Lochner” in post-
New Deal constitutional litigation). The origin of this rhetorical tradition lies in Justice Holmes’ 
celebrated dissent in Lochner itself, chiding the majority for deciding the case based on its preferred 
“economic theory” rather than constitutional principle, and thereby perverting the Fourteenth 
Amendment to “prevent the natural outcome of dominant opinion.” Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, 
J., dissenting). On the “progressive” interpretation of Lochner inaugurated by Holmes’ dissent, and the 
body of subsequent revisionist scholarship complicating that interpretation, see Lindsay, supra at 704–
05 and accompanying text. 
 81. See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 1 (characterizing Lochner as a principled defense of 
individual liberty); DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (2011) 
(same). 
 82. The remainder of this Part draws extensively from Lindsay, supra note 80, at 704–730; and 
Lindsay, supra note 24, at 70–77. 
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A. THE (BELATED AND EQUIVOCAL) CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ECONOMIC LIBERTY 
The jurisprudential foundations of “liberty of contract” were laid in the 
decades following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.83 In separate 
dissenting opinions in the landmark 1873 Slaughter-House Cases,84 Justices 
Stephen Field and Joseph Bradley famously argued that, in granting the Crescent 
City Company a twenty-five year butchering monopoly, the Louisiana legislature 
had deprived the butchers excluded from the monopoly of their privileges and 
immunities as citizens of the United States, in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.85 In these and subsequent opinions,86 Justices Field and Bradley 
planted the seeds of a constitutional “right of free labor” that would, decades later, 
blossom into “liberty of contract.” Their opinions are worth considering at some 
length because they illustrate both the novelty of this particular constitutional 
economic right, and its kinship with the common-law limits on the state police 
power discussed in Part I. In brief, I want to suggest that Field and Bradley’s 
constitutionalization of the “right of free labor” was less a defense of economic 
liberty per se than a jurisdictional hook that enabled the federal courts to enforce 
conditions on state legislative authority that were intrinsic to the police power 
itself—specifically, that regulations of liberty and property serve the general 
welfare, rather than the narrower interests of a favored group.  
In the Slaughter-House Cases, a five-justice majority denied that the 
Fourteenth Amendment had made the Court “a perpetual censor upon all 
legislation of the States [touching] on the civil rights of their own citizens.”87 
 
 83. My focus here is the development of an expansive, constitutionally novel understanding of 
“liberty” and “property” in post-Civil War period. The origins of “substantive due process,” which would 
later become the primary doctrinal vehicle for constitutional economic liberty, in fact precedes the Civil 
War. See generally Williams, supra note 72 (demonstrating that when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified in 1868, the phrase “due process of law” already “had developed . . . well-established 
substantive connotations as both a prohibition of legislative interference with vested rights and as a 
guarantee of general and impartial laws”). That said, the phrase “substantive due process” is itself a 
much later invention. Although today we routinely refer to the “substantive due process” right to 
“liberty of contract” (as well as a host of other modern “fundamental” rights), the term first appeared 
in a federal court opinion only in the 1940s, and was not applied to Lochner-style “liberty of contract” 
jurisprudence until the 1960s. See G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes’s 
Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 87, 108–10 (1997). For this reason, this Response generally (though 
not entirely) avoids applying the phrase to Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence, and instead refers 
to the “due process right to liberty of contract,” or “economic due process.” 
 84. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
 85. Id. at 83–111 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 111–24 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 86. After the Louisiana legislature subsequently revoked the butchering monopoly, the Crescent 
City Company brought suit, claiming that because it had expended great sums on a vast slaughterhouse 
and stockyard in reliance on its exclusive right, the legislative charter had taken on the character of an 
“irrepealable contract.” Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-
Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 749 (1884). The Court unanimously upheld the 
repeal, but Justices Field and Bradley wrote separate concurring opinions in order to further theorize 
the Fourteenth Amendment right to individual economic liberty. Id. at 754–60 (Field, J., concurring); id. 
at 760–66 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 87. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 78. 
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Justices Field and Bradley argued strenuously in dissent that Section I of the 
Amendment had in fact upended the nation’s federal structure of “double 
citizenship” in order “to provide National security against violation by the States of 
the fundamental rights of the citizen.”88 What exactly were the fundamental rights 
of American citizenship? Field and Bradley agreed that when the Declaration of 
Independence proclaimed that “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” were 
among the “inalienable rights” endowed in all men by “their Creator,” it identified 
“the fundamental rights which can only be taken away by due process of law, and 
which can only be interfered with . . . by lawful regulations necessary or proper for 
the mutual good of all.”89 Here are Richard Epstein’s “common law protections of 
life, liberty, and property.”90  
The contention that the Privileges and Immunities Clause authorized the 
federal courts to vindicate the fundamental rights of national citizenship against 
hostile state legislatures was not, by itself, especially remarkable. Most members 
of Congress who drafted, debated, and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment would 
have agreed, at least in principle, that Section 1 unsettled the nation’s traditional 
federalism.91 Justices Field and Bradley’s innovation lies, instead, in the breadth of 
meaning they ascribed to the phrase “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” 
The right “to adopt such calling, profession, or trade” was “an essential part of that 
liberty which it is the object of government to protect,” Bradley urged, “and a 
calling, when chosen, is a man’s property and right. Liberty and property are not 
protected where these rights are arbitrarily assailed.”92 Justice Field agreed, in a 
passage that would become an indispensable touchstone for late 19th-century 
state high courts: 
The equality of right . . . in the lawful pursuits of life . . . is the 
distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States. To them, 
everywhere, all pursuits, all professions, all avocations are open without 
other restrictions than such as are imposed equally upon all others . . . . 
This is the fundamental idea upon which our institutions rest, and unless 
adhered to in the legislation of the country our government will be a 
republic only in name. The fourteenth amendment . . . makes it essential 
. . . that this equality of right should be respected. . . . [B]y . . . the 
 
 88. Id. at 121–22 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Field agreed that as a result of Section 1, the 
“fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to him as a free man and a free citizen, 
now belong to him as a citizen of the United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship of any 
State.” Id. at 95 (Field, J., dissenting). 
 89. Id. at 122 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 90. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 98. 
 91. See e.g. GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL 
RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 226–28 (2006) (quoting leading congressional advocates of the 
Amendment, including Thaddeus Stevens and John Bingham, to that effect); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 72–80 (1988) (same). 
 92. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 110 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
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[butchering monopoly] the right of free labor, one of the most sacred and 
imprescriptible rights of man, is violated.93 
Of what, exactly, did the “sacred and imprescriptible” right of “free labor” consist? 
Field quoted at length one of the seminal texts of classical liberal political economy, 
Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations: 
‘The property which every man has in his own labor,’ says Adam Smith, 
‘as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most 
sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength 
and dexterity of his own hands; and to hinder him from employing this 
strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury 
to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a 
manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and 
of those who might be disposed to employ him.’94 
The most important jurisprudential legacy of Field’s opinion lies in this radical 
redefinition of constitutional “liberty” and “property.” For Field, “property” 
encompassed not only land and tangible goods, but anything with market value, 
including one’s labor; “liberty” referred not only to physical freedom, but freedom 
to act in the marketplace. This was a vision of individual economic liberty adapted 
not to a republic of independent artisans and craftsmen, but to the propertyless 
hirelings who increasingly populated the swelling industrial labor force—men 
whose economic personhood consisted entirely in their capacity to alienate their 
labor for a price.95 It was also a vision that resonated deeply with the great moral 
and political cause of the previous generation—the abolition of slavery. 
Abolitionists had celebrated the voluntary sale of labor as the antithesis of slavery; 
and the right to dispose of one’s labor at market price had taken on the moral and 
emotional weight of opposing human bondage. Slave emancipation and the Civil 
 
 93. Id. at 109–10 (Field, J., dissenting).  
 94. Id. at 110 n.39 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776)); see 
Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & 
Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (1884) (Field, J., concurring) (quoting the same passage). 
 95. In the 1870s, a time of rapid industrialization in the northern states, the meaning of “free 
labor” was an ideologically freighted subject of social and political debate. As the traditional centerpiece 
of republican political theory, the “free labor” ideal had long been embodied in the figure of the self-
employed farmer or artisan, whose ownership of productive property served as a guarantee of 
economic self-sufficiency, and thus personal “independence”—the essential requisite for virtuous 
citizenship. To labor for a wage, by contrast, was to subject one’s personal autonomy, including one’s 
economic livelihood and even political will, to the authority of an employer. See LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, 
A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE MAKING OF CONSUMER SOCIETY 22–24 (1997); DAVID MONTGOMERY, 
BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS, 1862–1872, at 30–33 (1967); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM 
BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 9–10 
(1998). For Field, the New Orleans butchers, who were struggling against a legislative monopoly that 
threatened to deprive them of their independence and reduce them to the condition of mere wage 
laborers, were exemplars of this free labor ideal. By championing the butchers’ “equality of right . . . in 
the ordinary avocations of life,” Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 109, Field was attempting 
to vindicate their republican independence. See Lindsay, supra note 24, at 70–71. 
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Rights Act of 1866, securing the right to contract for the sale of one’s labor as an 
essential right of citizenship, enshrined this vision into law.96 It was this notion of a 
constitutional right of property in, and liberty to dispose of, one’s labor that would 
later ripen into “liberty of contract.”  
Surely this is music to classical liberal ears. Yet even as Justices Field and 
Bradley characterized the “right to free labor” as a “sacred and imprescriptible” 
privilege of U.S. citizenship, the constitutional limitation they actually applied bears 
a closer affinity with the common law proscription of special privileges, or “class 
legislation,” than with the protection of individual economic liberty per se. The 
right to free labor, Field explained, protected the citizen only against 
“discriminating and partial enactments, favoring some to the impairment of the 
rights of others.”97 It thus served as a constitutional bulwark against the “arbitrary 
invasion by State authority of . . . the right to pursue . . . happiness unrestrained, 
except by just, equal, and impartial laws.”98 It was not the regulation of butchering 
per se that troubled Field and Bradley, or even the legislature’s interference with 
the economic prerogatives of individual butchers; but rather its unjust, “partial,” 
“arbitrary” discrimination against a disfavored class of butchers.99 A few years later, 
 
 96. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.); see also STANLEY, supra note 95, at 17–18 (discussing the role of abolitionism in the moral and 
legal construction of “free labor”); William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law 
in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 782–86 (1985) (same). In defining the privileges and immunities 
that the Fourteenth Amendment protected from state abridgement, Justice Field drew explicitly from 
the Civil Rights Act. Although passed before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Field 
explained, the Act expressed Congress’ understanding of the term “privileges and immunities” as it was 
used in Section I. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting). That 
understanding included, Field wrote, quoting directly from the Act, the right “to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real 
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
person and property.” Id. (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31 § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981)). Among such rights, Field continued, “must be placed the right to pursue 
a lawful employment in a lawful manner, without other restraint than such as equally effects all 
persons.” Id. at 97. 
 97. Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 758 (Field, J., concurring). Leading scholars of Lochner-era police 
powers jurisprudence have interpreted Field and Bradley’s opinions in this light, tracing Lochner-era 
judicial scrutiny of economic regulations to Jacksonian opposition to special legislative privileges. See 
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS 
JURISPRUDENCE 64–76 (1993). Intellectual-biographical studies of leading late 19th-century figures in the 
constitutionalization of individual economic liberty persuasively present jurists such as Stephen Field 
and the judge and treatise author Thomas Cooley not as laissez-faire ideologues, but rather as principled 
neo-Jacksonians, committed to the defense of the general good against the corrupting influence of 
powerful economic interests. See generally Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and “Laissez-Faire 
Constitutionalism”: A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751 (1967); Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and 
the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire 
Constitutionalism, 1863–1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (1975). 
 98. Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 759 (Field, J., concurring). 
 99. Id. at 758. Justice Field continued:  
[T]he ordinary pursuits of life, forming the large mass of industrial avocations, are and 
ought to be free and open to all, subject only to such general regulations, applying equally 
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in upholding a different legislative restraint on the pursuit of one’s chosen vocation 
against an economic due process challenge, Field explained that the “great purpose 
of the requirement [of due process] is to exclude everything that is arbitrary and 
capricious in legislation affecting the rights of the citizen.”100 But “legislation is not 
open to the charge of depriving one of his rights without due process of law, if it be 
general in its operation upon the subjects to which it relates . . . .”101 And in fact, 
the New Orleans butchering monopoly was widely viewed at the time as an act of 
naked legislative favoritism.102 Understood as a demand for legislative impartiality, 
the Fourteenth Amendment right to economic liberty appears not as constitutional 
trump against state economic regulation, but rather as a convenient jurisdictional 
hook through which the federal courts might enforce constraints on legislative 
authority that were intrinsic to the police power itself. 
B. “LIBERTY OF CONTRACT” AND THE (SORT OF) CLASSICAL LIBERAL MOMENT 
The seed of constitutional economic liberty planted by Justices Field and 
Bradley bore fruit almost immediately.103 Several state high court opinions from 
the 1880s striking down labor regulations read like tributes to the Slaughterhouse 
dissents. As the New York Court of Appeals declared in 1885, “[l]iberty, in its broad 
sense as understood in this country, means the right, not only of freedom from 
actual servitude, imprisonment or restraint, but the right of one to use his faculties 
in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful 
calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation.”104 Then in 1897, the U.S. 
 
to all, as the general good may demand; and the grant to the favored few of a monopoly 
in any of these common callings is necessarily an outrage upon the liberty of the citizen 
. . . .  
Id. at 763. 
 100. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1889) (upholding a medical licensing requirement 
against constitutional challenge). 
 101. Id. 
 102. On the political background of the legislation, see generally RONALD M. LABBÉ & JONATHAN LURIE, 
THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2003). 
 103. Field and Bradley were joined in this project by the jurist and treatise writer Thomas Cooley, 
whose influential Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, first published shortly before the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, argued that state due process clauses substantively limited the authority 
of legislatures to regulate common law property rights. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 
351–61 (1868). After Slaughterhouse, writes legal historian William Forbath, those who felt unjustly 
burdened by a particular economic regulation “could proceed to court with Field’s sacred banner of 
Free Labor in one hand and Cooley’s Treatise in the other.” Forbath, supra note 96, at 794.  
 104. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 106 (N.Y. 1885) (invalidating a state law prohibiting the manufacture 
of cigars in certain tenement houses). See also Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354, 356 (Pa. 1886) (striking 
down a state law requiring that iron workers be paid in cash at regular intervals as an unconstitutional 
attempt to “prevent persons who are sui juris from making their own contracts” that was “not only 
degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United States”); State v. 
Goodwill, 10 S.E. 285, 286 (W. Va. 1889) (striking down a state law forbidding payment in company 
script on the ground that it interfered with the “liberty” of every man “to pursue any lawful trade or 
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Supreme Court, in dicta, attached the New York court’s precise formulation to the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, adding that a person must also 
be free “to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential” 
to securing such liberties.105 The doctrinal stage for constitutional “liberty of 
contract” was set. 
Opening night, of course, came a decade later, in Lochner v. New York, when 
the Supreme Court struck down a maximum hours law for bakers on the ground 
that it violated one’s “right to make a contract in relation to his business,” including 
his “right to purchase and sell labor.”106 Justice Rufus Peckham’s majority opinion 
incorporates elements of the familiar common law injunction against special 
legislative privileges alongside a recognizably modern fundamental rights analysis. 
This hybrid quality has made the opinion famously resistant to simple 
characterization, and has provided generations of historians and legal scholars with 
a fertile subject of interpretation and debate. 
Before turning to Peckham’s opinion itself, it is helpful to situate Lochner in its 
historical context. In the half-century following the end of the Civil War, Americans 
experienced a remarkable revolution in their social and economic order, as their 
traditional (if highly idealized) republic of independent farmers and artisans was 
transformed into an industrial society characterized by large corporate employers, 
the proliferation of low-skill occupations, and an intensely competitive wage 
system. To many contemporaries, this industrial reorganization of American life 
and labor subverted prevailing ideals of economic freedom and independence—
hotly contested concepts in the post-Civil War era, but ones that required, at the 
very least, a meaningful measure of autonomy in individual decision-making. In 
response, wage workers and their allies in progressive reform movements 
prevailed on state legislatures to ensure certain basic guarantees and protections 
for workers, such as requiring payment of wages in cash and at regular intervals, 
and establishing minimum wages and maximum hours.107 Such demands for 
“special protection from the coercive effects of a corporate industrial economy,” 
Gillman writes, “constituted a direct challenge to an established tenet of political 
legitimacy”—the principal of state neutrality.108 As I discussed in Part I, that 
neutrality principle was embodied in the constitutive terms of the police power—
specifically, the requirement that regulatory interference with individual liberty or 
property serve the public good and general welfare, rather than the “partial” 
interests of a favored class. 
Justice Peckham’s majority opinion reflects this tension. Peckham wasted little 
time in announcing that a man’s “right to make a contract in relation to his 
 
avocation” (quoting People v. Gillson, 109 N.Y. 389, 399 (N.Y. 1888))). See generally Lindsay, supra 24, 
at 73 & nn. 95–100. 
 105. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). 
 106. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).  
 107. See GILLMAN, supra note 97, at 14; Lindsay, supra note 80, at 715. 
 108. GILLMAN, supra note 97, at 14.  
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business” included “[t]he right to purchase or to sell labor.”109 Although the 
challenged hours regulation “necessarily interfere[d] with” that right, that was not 
the end of the matter.110 There existed “certain powers . . . somewhat vaguely 
termed police powers,” Peckham explained, that inhered “in the sovereignty of 
each State,” and with which “the 14th Amendment was not designed to 
interfere.”111 “Both [the] property and liberty” protected were thus “held on such 
reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the . . . State in the exercise of those 
powers.”112 Foremost among those conditions was the requirement that police 
regulations serve “the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public,” 
rather than the partial interests of a particular class.113 
Up to this point, Peckham’s analysis carries distinct echoes of the common-
law (and Jacksonian) prohibition against special legislative privileges that Justices 
Field and Bradley read into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. In this respect, the new due process right to “liberty of contract” delimited 
state authority not by establishing a bastion of private economic prerogative that 
the legislature could not breach, but rather by enabling the federal courts, for the 
first time, to enforce conditions on the exercise of state regulatory authority that 
were intrinsic to the police power itself. As Peckham put it, if the federal courts 
could not enforce limits on state regulation, the “14th Amendment would have no 
efficacy and the legislatures of the States would have unbounded power, and it 
would be enough to say that any piece of legislation was enacted to conserve the 
morals, the health or the safety of the people.”114 If courts deferred to every 
legislative assertion of public purpose, “no matter how absolutely without 
foundation . . . [t]he claim of the police power would be a mere pretext,—[and] 
become another and [a] delusive name for the supreme sovereignty of the state to 
be exercised free from constitutional constraint.”115 Rather, the Fourteenth 
Amendment had made it the business of the federal courts to scrutinize the police 
rationale proffered by a state legislature, and ensure that the claims of public 
purpose were more than “mere pretext.”116 “In every case that comes before this 
court . . . where legislation of this character is concerned and where the protection 
of the Federal Constitution is sought,” Peckham continued, “the question 
necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police 
power of the state, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference 
with the right of the individual to his personal liberty . . . ?”117 
 
 109. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. 
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Yet the due process right to liberty of contract did more than authorize the 
federal courts to enforce familiar common law limits on state police authority. 
Because the state’s effort to intercede in the terms of employment now registered 
constitutionally, it triggered a much more exacting review of the legislative 
rationale than pre-Civil War state common law courts would have recognized. 
“[B]efore an act can be held to be valid which interferes with the general right of 
an individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his 
own labor,” Peckham explained, the regulation “must have a more direct relation, 
as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate.”118 
This approach comports with Epstein’s classical liberal position. That position, 
Epstein explains, endorses “a broad reading of liberty under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment,”119 covering a host of “economic, expressive, or 
intimate”120 interests, and “gives narrow weight to purported justifications both as 
to the ends the state chooses and the means it uses to achieve them.”121  
In Lochner, Justice Peckham considered two possible legislative ends. The first, 
whether the act was “valid as a labor law, pure and simple,” could “be dismissed in 
a few words,” Peckham declared.122 Because “bakers as a class are . . . equal in 
intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, [and thus] 
. . . able to assert their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm 
of the state,” he reasoned, “the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree 
affected” by a law “interfering with their independence of judgment and of 
action.”123 Viewed as a “labor law,” the regulation was naked class legislation. 
Peckham then turned to the second proffered legislative end—that the law 
protected “the health of the individual engaged in the occupation of a baker.”124 
Peckham acknowledged that, in light of the voluminous “statistics regarding all 
trades and occupations” introduced in the case, “the trade of a baker does not 
appear to be as healthy as some other trades.”125 In the pre-Lochner era marked by 
judicial deference toward a state’s regulatory rationale, such a finding would have 
supplied an ample factual basis to uphold the law as a valid health regulation. 
Indeed, earlier in his opinion Peckham noted that judicial scrutiny of state police 
regulations traditionally had “been guided by rules of a very liberal nature.”126 But 
because the challenged hours regulation implicated “the right of free contract on 
the part of the individual,” the Court required greater congruence between 
 
 118. Id. at 57–58. 
 119. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 338. 
 120. Id. at 305. 
 121. Id. at 310. 
 122. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 57. The hours regulation “does not affect any other portion of the public than those who 
are engaged in that occupation,” Peckham explained, for “[c]lean and wholesome bread does not 
depend upon whether the baker works but ten hours per day or sixty hours a week.” Id. 
 125. Id. at 59. 
 126. Id. at 54. 
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legislative ends and means.127 As Peckham explained, “[t]here must be more than 
the . . . possible existence of some small amount of unhealthiness to warrant 
legislative interference with liberty.”128 Because baking was not distinctly more 
dangerous than many other common trades, Peckham concluded, it was not 
“unhealthy . . . to that degree which would authorize the legislature to interfere 
with the right to labor.”129 
Peckham, like Epstein, also understood heightened judicial scrutiny of 
economic regulations as a bulwark against the ominous expansion of the state 
police power generally. Peckham noted the recent increase in legislative 
“interference . . . with the ordinary trades and occupations of the people,” and 
approvingly cited a series of state court decisions striking down such regulations as 
unconstitutional deprivations of individual liberty and property.130 If the State of 
New York could abridge “the right of an individual, sui juris,” to contract for the sale 
of his labor, “there would seem to be no length to which legislation of this nature 
might not go.”131 “No trade, no occupation, no mode of earning one’s living, could 
escape this all-pervading power,”132 he cautioned. As a result, the state “would 
assume the position of a supervisor, or pater familias, over every act of the 
individual, and its right of governmental interference with his hours of labor, his 
hours of exercise, the character thereof, and the extent to which it shall be carried 
would be recognized and upheld.”133 At stake for the majority was not only the 
principle of governmental neutrality, or even freedom of contract, but the 
sovereignty of the individual in relation to the authority of the state.  
In short, we might identify two distinct but interrelated principles at play in 
Lochner: the traditional common law requirement that police regulations serve the 
general interest (i.e., the “state neutrality” principle) and the defense of individual 
prerogative, economic or otherwise, against state interference (i.e., the “individual 
 
 127. Id. at 59. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 63. 
 131. Id. at 58. 
 132. Id. at 59. “A printer, a tinsmith, a locksmith, a carpenter, a cabinetmaker, a dry goods clerk, a 
bank’s, a lawyer’s or a physician’s clerk, or a clerk in almost any kind of business, would all come under 
the power of the legislature,” Peckham continued. Id. If the Court were to endorse “the interest of the 
state that its population should be strong and robust,” and thereby sanction as a valid health law “any 
legislation which may be said to tend to make people healthy,” all manner of human conduct “would 
come under the restrictive sway of the legislature.” Id. at 60. By way of illustration, Peckham described 
a parade of horribles running more than a page in length. Under the government’s theory, he declared:  
Not only the hours of employees, but the hours of employers, could be regulated, and 
doctors, lawyers, scientists, all professional men, as well as athletes and artisans, could be 
forbidden to fatigue their brains and bodies by prolonged hours of exercise, lest the 
fighting strength of the state be impaired. 
Id. at 60–61. “We mention these extreme cases,” Peckham explained, “because the contention is 
extreme.” Id. at 61. 
 133. Id. at 62. 
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sovereignty” principle).134 In Lochner, these two principles operate hand-in-hand: 
The state’s abridgement of Joseph Lochner’s liberty triggered heightened scrutiny 
of the legislative rationale, which was found wanting precisely because the 
legislature had improperly favored “bakers as a class.”135 In the majority’s view, one 
highly salutary effect of that decision (though not its formal stated basis) was to 
limit the scope of state authority at a time of significant regulatory expansion. The 
two principles are nevertheless conceptually distinct, and need not travel in 
tandem. For example, one who neither sanctifies individual economic prerogatives 
per se, nor worries about the size of government generally, can still believe that 
courts should guard vigilantly against legislative favoritism—a position that is 
theoretically compatible with big, active government. Conversely, one can believe, 
as Epstein does, that courts should maximize individual economic prerogative by 
subjecting every state encroachment, “partial” and “general” alike, to exacting 
scrutiny. Under this view, a breach of the state neutrality principle is sufficient but 
not necessary to trigger heightened scrutiny. 
Scholars disagree about which of these two principles—state neutrality or 
individual sovereignty—predominates in Lochner.136 And as we have seen, 
Peckham’s opinion does indeed offer support for both readings. At the very least, 
Peckham melded a neo-Jacksonian objection to class legislation with “[t]he laissez-
faire concept of liberty [that was then] the common currency among the elite in 
the United States.”137 Yet the difficulty of pointing to Lochner’s “true” meaning is 
due also to the decision’s pivotal position in the Court’s highly contested, decades-
long transition between two historical modes of protecting individual liberty. As I 
 
 134. Legal historian G. Edward White similarly describes two distinct but often intermingled strains of 
American political economy and legal/constitutional thought that came to bear on the Court’s Lochner-era 
police powers jurisprudence, which he labels, respectively, the “anti-class principle” and the “public/private 
distinction.” White concludes, as do I, that the “analytical lynchpin” of Lochner for all of the Justices except 
Holmes was not “liberty of contract” per se, but “the anticlass principle informed by the heritage of ‘free 
labor’ theory.” White, supra note 83, at 101. 
 135. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905). 
 136. For example, Professor David E. Bernstein argues that the Court’s analysis in Lochner turns 
“on individual liberty rights rather than hostility to class legislation.” BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 33–34. 
He acknowledges that the “class legislation” theme informed the Court’s review of labor legislation, but 
concludes that some Lochner revisionists have overstated the importance of the “state neutrality” 
principle, which, he maintains, was “barely evident in Peckham’s majority opinion.” Id. at 33. Rather, 
Bernstein asserts that Peckham’s opinion focused primarily “on the right to liberty of contract, and 
relegated the more equalitarian concerns” rooted in the principle of state neutrality “to an oblique 
aside.” Id. at 16. In my view, the balance of evidence runs against Bernstein’s reading. First, Peckham 
framed the basic question before the Court in terms of traditional police power categories: “Is this a 
fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power of the state, or is it an unreasonable, 
unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty .  . . ?” 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905). Moreover, contemporary commentary on Lochner was 
dominated by discussion of the anti-class principle. The fact is that the New York bakery law was a labor 
law, “pure and simple,” as everyone understood. The question that preoccupied contemporaries was 
precisely whether a labor law intended by the legislature to mitigate laborers’ disadvantage in the 
bargaining process might nevertheless serve the general welfare. See White, supra note 83, at 104–05. 
 137. Benedict, supra note 22, at 313. 
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discussed in Part I, for most of the 19th century, individual rights were viewed as 
“specific immunities” from state authority—in Gillman’s helpful formulation, the 
sphere of individual prerogative that was “left over after [the] government ha[d] 
reached the limits of its authorized power.”138 During the late-19th and early 20th 
centuries, in response to the era’s broad expansion of state economic regulation, 
the Court gradually relinquished the traditional “limited powers-residual 
freedoms” model in favor of a “general powers-preferred freedoms” model that 
essentially conceded the plenary nature of much state and federal regulatory 
authority while “extend[ing] special protections to particularly important rights and 
liberties.”139 
Consider Lochner in this light. For many legislators, labor spokesmen, and 
reformers, laws such as New York’s maximum hours provision merely provided 
wage workers with modest protection against the depredations of the industrial 
economy. For such advocates of regulation, prohibiting bakers from working more 
than ten hours per day or 60 hours per week was surely no more an encroachment 
on individual economic prerogatives than, for example, prohibiting a farmer from 
selling produce outside of a specific location defined by ordinance. Yet for other 
contemporaries, state interference in the terms of employment posed a novel 
challenge to the principle of state neutrality as they understood it. As heirs to the 
long-standing common law prohibition on special legislative privileges, Lochner-era 
judges perceived their critical duty to be that of distinguishing between the vast 
majority of state police regulations that were legitimately directed toward the 
public health and welfare, and the illegitimate minority that were intended to serve 
the interests of a narrow class. Judges reared on a pre-industrial understanding of 
state neutrality—and perhaps influenced, as well, by laissez-faire ideas then in 
circulation—presumed that contractual exchange functioned as a neutral arbiter 
of the parties’ economic preferences; accordingly, they viewed some efforts to 
curb exploitative labor practices as legislative favoritism. As a result, even courts 
that routinely upheld all variety of economic regulations could condemn as 
illegitimate “class legislation” reform initiatives directed toward mitigating the 
inequality of bargaining power between employers and employees. Limiting state 
regulatory authority to matters of the public health and general welfare was not 
new in principle; in practice, however, direct legislative interference with the 
specific terms of employment tested those limits in a new way.140  
Viewed in this context, the Lochner Court struck down New York’s maximum 
hours law because five justices were not persuaded that limiting the number of 
hours worked by bakers meaningfully served the general welfare or public health. 
Because the statute thus transgressed the constitutive terms of the police power, 
 
 138. Gillman, supra note 39, at 625. 
 139. Id. at 640, 643. 
 140. For an insightful discussion of the now-sizeable body of revisionist historical scholarship 
characterizing Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence as a clash between traditional police powers 
categories and “[t]he development of class conflict in an increasingly industrial society.” See Rowe, 
supra note 80, at 232. 
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the legislature had exceeded its authority. In this respect, however, the handful of 
labor-regulation cases headlined by Lochner were distinct outliers.141 Throughout 
this period, federal and state courts upheld the vast majority of police regulations 
against constitutional challenge. Two empirical studies published at the height of 
the Lochner era by the legal historian Charles Warren provide striking evidence.142 
Warren set out to test the common “progressive” complaint that the Supreme 
Court had fallen out of step “with modern conditions,” frustrating the ability of 
state legislatures to exercise their police authority “in the interest of the general 
public welfare.”143 To do so, he reviewed all 560 U.S. Supreme Court cases decided 
between 1887 and 1911 in which petitioners challenged the constitutionality of a 
“social or economic” regulation. Warren reported that of those 560, the Court 
struck down only three (including the New York law challenged in Lochner).144 “The 
actual record of the Court,” he concluded, “thus shows how little chance a litigant 
has of inducing the Court to restrict the police power of a State, or to overthrow 
State laws under the ‘due process’ clause; in other words, it shows the Court to be 
a bulwark to the State police power, not a destroyer.”145 Modern scholars confirm 
Warren’s assessment.146 Indeed, contrary to the modern denomination of the 
period between 1905 and 1937 as the “Locnher era,” social and economic 
regulation exploded in the early 20th century, as a “new forcefulness and 
resourcefulness crept into discussions of the police power.”147 In short, the select 
cast of iconic Lochner-era cases that Epstein holds up as emblems of classical liberal 
constitutionalism were the exception rather than the rule.  
Although courts were most suspicious of governmental intermeddling in labor 
relations, the justices nevertheless were prepared to uphold regulations that 
 
 141. In addition to the Court’s later decisions striking down minimum wage statues, see infra notes 
146–158 and accompanying text, Lochner’s “progeny” includes two decisions striking down on “liberty 
of contract” grounds state and federal laws protecting collective bargaining. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 
U.S. 1, 26 (1915)(striking down Kansas statute prohibiting employers from requiring employees, as a 
condition of employment, to agree not to join a labor union); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 171, 
180 (1908)(striking down the federal Erdman Act of 1898, making it a criminal offense to refuse to hire 
or to discharge a worker because of membership in a labor union). 
 142. Charles Warren, A Bulwark to the State Police Power—The United States Supreme Court, 13 
COLUM. L. REV. 667 (1913) [hereinafter Warren, Bulwark]; Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the 
United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294 (1913) [hereinafter Warren, Progressiveness]. 
 143. Warren, Bulwark, supra note 142, at 667. 
 144. Warren, Progressiveness, supra note 142, at 295. 
 145. Id. at 310. 
 146. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 22, at 297; William E. Forbath, Politics, State-Building, and the Courts, 1870–
1920, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 643, 645 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008); 
Gillman, supra note 39, at 634; Novak, supra note 22, at 273. As the political scientist Karren Orren writes, “many reform 
landmarks of Progressive lawmaking—railroad regulation, antitrust statutes, protective food and drug statutes, industrial 
accident statutes, and others—survived judicial scrutiny at state and federal levels . . . Neither repudiated nor significantly 
weakened, these programs carried on as bulwarks of the American welfare state for the next half-century.” Karen Orren, 
The Laws of Industrial Organization, 1870–1920, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 531, 532 (Michael Grossberg 
& Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). 
 147. Novak, supra note 22, at 269. 
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directly abridged the contractual freedom of employers and employees when they 
were persuaded that the interference with liberty served the public health or 
welfare.148 In Holden v. Hardy, for example, decided barely a year after the Court 
first recognized a man’s due process right “to earn his livelihood by any lawful 
calling[, and] to pursue any livelihood or avocation,”149 seven justices agreed that 
in industries where employers “and their operatives do not stand upon an 
equality,” the legislature “may properly interpose its authority.” In such 
circumstances, the Court explained, “the proprietors lay down the rules, and the 
laborers are practically constrained to obey them.”150 Even when “both parties are 
of full age, and competent to contract,” the public retains an interest in the welfare 
of the employee, who, the legislature may reasonably judge, needs to “be 
protected against himself.”151 The Court then concluded, in language that both 
recalls the public welfare rationale of antebellum police power cases and 
anticipates the “public right” to regulate of the New Deal cases, “[t]he whole is no 
greater than the sum of all the parts, and when the individual health, safety, and 
welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the state must suffer.”152 
This is not to deny that the Court’s Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence 
endorsed classical liberal themes. Some of it certainly did. Indeed, the apogee of 
constitutional economic liberty came not in Lochner itself, but two decades later in 
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, when a five-justice majority struck down a federal 
statute establishing a minimum wage for women in Washington, D.C.153 In Adkins, 
the constitutional right to “liberty of contract” ripened into a more pointed 
injunction against governmental interference in the private labor market. The 
majority opinion omits Lochner’s broad reflection on the scope of the police power; 
instead, the constitutional right itself takes center stage, and does most of the 
analytical work. “[F]reedom of contract is . . . the general rule,” Justice Sutherland 
explained, “and restraint the exception, and the exercise of legislative authority to 
abridge it can be justified only by . . . exceptional circumstances.”154 With regard to 
 
 148. On the court’s relative assertiveness with respect to labor regulations, Orren writes:  
[D]uring the period from 1870 to 1920, American judges administered one set of rules . . . 
when the subject matter of the dispute before them was . . . production and trade of goods 
and money [,] and another set when the subject matter . . . was . . . relations between 
master and servant and employees’ collective action.  
Orren, supra note 146, at 533. 
 149. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 598 (1897). 
 150. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 (1898) (upholding a Utah law limiting the hours of labor 
for miners and smelters). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.; see also Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding an Oregon law limiting the 
hours of labor for women and men to ten hours per day, and requiring employers to pay time-and-a-
half wages for up to three overtime hours per day); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding 
an Oregon law limiting the hours of labor for women to ten hours per day). 
 153. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
 154. Id. at 546. 
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the challenged minimum wage law, such circumstances were wholly lacking. The 
law was “simply and exclusively a price-fixing law,” Sutherland declared, because it 
prevented individuals from “freely contract[ing] with one another in respect to the 
price for which one shall render service to the other in a purely private employment 
where both are willing, perhaps anxious, to agree.”155 When the government fixes 
a wage according to the minimum needs of the employee rather than the market 
value of the services provided, “it amounts to a compulsory exaction from the 
employer” of “an arbitrary payment . . . having no causal connection with his 
business, or the contract of the work the employee engages to do.”156 This 
compelled disbursement, divorced from a market-driven notion of value, rendered 
the statute “a naked, arbitrary exercise of power,”157 and thus “put[] upon it the 
stamp of invalidity.”158 
Sutherland’s insistence that governmental interference with individual 
prerogatives, economic or otherwise, was appropriately subject to exacting 
scrutiny well serves the “universal ideal” at the center of Epstein’s classical liberal 
vision—that outside of a few exceptional and very narrow circumstances, “the 
terms of [a] contract [be] left to the parties to devise.”159 Yet a mere 14 years later, 
in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, the Court overturned Adkins and brought the 
Lochner era to a decisive end.160 Henceforth, legislative interference with the terms 
of contract would be upheld so long as the regulation was “reasonable in relation 
to its subject and [was] adopted in the interests of the community.”161 In Epstein’s 
telling, Parrish and its federal power counterpart, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 
inaugurated a “progressive counterrevolution” that “vanquished” a century-and-a-
 
 155. Id. at 555.  
 156. Id. at 557–58. 
 157. Id. at 559. 
 158. Id. at 558. Twelve years later, in Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), overruled in part 
by Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass’n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), the Court relied entirely 
on Adkins to strike down a New York law prohibiting the payment of “oppressive and unreasonable” 
wages. The Act’s fatal flaw, according to the Court—the feature that rendered it an unconstitutional 
deprivation of economic liberty—was the legislature’s definition of “oppressive and unreasonable” to 
include wages that were “less than sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living necessary to health.” 
Id. at 605 (quoting N.Y Labor Law § 551(7) (1933)). As in Adkins, to fix a wage through any means but 
private bargaining rendered the wage an “arbitrary” “exaction,” and thus a form of economic 
compulsion in conflict with constitutional economic liberty. 
 159. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 338. 
 160. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 161. Id. at 391. The only thing the Court had to decide, Hughes explained, was that a challenged 
economic regulation—in Parrish, a statutory minimum wage for women—was not an “arbitrary and 
capricious” means of protecting workers from “the most injurious competition” in the labor market. Id. 
at 399. “[I]f the protection of women is a legitimate end of the exercise of state power,” the Court 
queried, “how can it be said that the requirement of the payment of a minimum wage fairly fixed in 
order to meet the very necessities of existence is not an admissible means to that end?” Id. at 398. 
Thenceforth, the Court explained the following year, “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary 
commercial transactions” would be upheld unless the available facts “preclude the assumption that it 
rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.” United States 
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
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half of limited government and constitutional economic liberty, setting American 
constitutionalism along an epochal, deeply misguided detour from its original 
classical liberal course.162 Epstein is correct, of course, to view the New Deal as an 
important turning point for the constitutional review of economic regulation, both 
state and federal. Yet as Part I demonstrated, Parrish and its lineage of “rational 
basis” decisions did not invent the presumption of validity for economic 
regulations.163 
Rather, the Parrish Court revived the presumption of validity with which 
common law courts approached police regulations throughout the 19th century, 
and which the Lochner-era Court had (equivocally and discretely) unsettled three 
decades earlier. Chief Justice Hughes’ majority opinion bears close attention. Elsie 
Parrish, a chambermaid at the West Coast Hotel, had sued her employer to recover 
$216.19—the difference between the wages paid to her and the minimum wage 
fixed by Washington State.164 The Hotel challenged the statutory minimum wage 
on the basis of Adkins, arguing that it unconstitutionally deprived employers and 
employees alike of “freedom of contract.”165 Hughes retorted:  
What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of 
contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty 
without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation, the 
 
 162. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 34. With regard to rights of liberty and property, Epstein writes:  
Historically, the magnitude of the shift in political and constitutional orientation between 
the (largely) classical liberal and the (largely) progressive view is captured in one critical 
flip-flop. Roughly speaking, economic liberties, and to a lesser extent property rights, 
received strong protection in the pre-1937 era and far weaker protection thereafter.  
Id. at 337. 
  Although it is does not bear directly on either Epstein’s thesis or my critique, it is worth noting 
for the sake of precision that the Court arguably disavowed the “absolute and uncontrollable liberty” of 
Adkins three years before the constitutional “revolution” of 1937. In Nebbia v. New York, the Court 
rejected a substantive due process challenge to a New York State statute fixing the price of milk. Nebbia 
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, the Court explained, “do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare,” 
but merely require “that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process.” Id. 
“And the guaranty of due process . . . demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or 
capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought 
to be attained.” Id. Accordingly, revisionist scholars have challenged the dating of the New Deal 
“revolution.” Professor Barry Cushman persuasively argues that the watershed moment in the New Deal 
constitutional revolution came not in 1937, but three years earlier, in Nebbia, when the Court 
abandoned the long-standing distinction between businesses “affected with a public interest,” over 
which the states and Congress traditionally enjoyed broad regulatory authority under their police and 
commerce powers, respectively, and “private” businesses, which were buffered against governmental 
intervention. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION 154–55 (1998). By the time the Court decided Parrish, Cushman argues, it thus had already 
discarded an essential premise of economic substantive due process—the notion that only a discrete 
class of public and quasi-public enterprises were susceptible to wage and price regulations. Id. 
 163. See generally Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Caroline Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144. 
 164. Parrish, 300 U.S. at 388.  
 165. Id.  
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Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable 
liberty. . . . [T]he liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization 
which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the 
health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people.166 
Parrish not only spurned constitutional liberty of contract, however. Hughes’ 
opinion also took “judicial notice” of what had become “common knowledge 
through the length and breadth of the land”—that the economic well-being of 
individuals was integral to the “public interest.”167 “What can be closer to the public 
interest,” Hughes queried, “than the health of women and their protection from 
unscrupulous and overreaching employers?”168 Indeed, “recent economic 
experience” had brought the very public implications of putatively “private” 
economic hardship “into a strong light”: 
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with 
respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenseless against 
the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health and well 
being, but casts a direct burden for their support upon the community. 
What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called upon to pay. 
The bare cost of living must be met . . . . The community is not bound to 
provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers.169 
Although reformers, organized laborers, and progressive politicians had long 
expounded the connection between individual and public welfare, the sustained 
economic crisis of the 1930s had made manifest that interdependence in stark and 
undeniable fashion.  
Indeed, the Great Depression had exposed as a farce the two classical liberal 
presumptions that undergirded Lochner-era constitutional liberty of contract: first, 
that the parties to a labor contract “have an equal right to obtain from each other 
the best terms they can as the result of private bargaining;”170 and second, “that 
the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by”171 the economic 
hardship of individual workers. As long as those presumptions remained intact, 
 
 166. Id. at 391. 
 167. Id. at 399. 
 168. Id. at 398. 
 169. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 399 (1937). 
 170. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923). Epstein’s vision shares that guiding faith. 
“[I]n all regimes of private property and freedom of contract,” he writes, “the contract is made to the 
very end that each may gain something that he needs or desires more urgently than that which he 
proposes to give in exchange.” EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 339–40 (quoting Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 
17 (1915)). Constitutional review of all economic interventions should thus be guided by “the simple 
point that mutual benefits arise from voluntary exchanges no matter how great the initial wealth 
differentials may be.” Id. at 340. Accordingly, Epstein dismisses the “progressive” contention that 
industrialization altered this timeless truth, which, he asserts, rests on both the misguided equation of 
“large firm size with market power,” and the uniquely compulsory quality of state (as compared to 
corporate) power. Id. at 41–42, 340. 
 171. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905). 
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legislative intermeddling in workers’ “independence of judgment and of action”172 
could appear “unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary,”173 and thus a clear 
violation of the long-standing state neutrality principle. But in the face of mass 
poverty, homelessness, and epidemic levels of unemployment (25% nationally at 
the height of the Depression; much higher in some cities and regions)174 that left 
throngs of able-bodied men pleading for virtually any paid labor, judicial assertions 
of workers’ “equal bargaining power” rang hollow, and statutory labor standards 
and/or collective bargaining rights came to look like necessary safeguards rather 
than special privileges.  
To the extent that the Lochner era does represent a classical liberal moment—
and, as I have argued, that interpretation is equivocal at best—it was not the 
belated fulfillment of a worldview woven into the nation’s constitutional fabric 
more than a century earlier, but rather a contentious, uncertain, and somewhat 
muddled process of regulatory and constitutional adaptation. When Chief Justice 
Hughes referred in Parrish to the “liberty in a social organization which requires the 
protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and 
welfare of the people,”175 he was neither “rewriting” the Constitution nor 
“vanquishing” 150 (or even thirty) years of classical liberal hegemony, as classical 
liberal critics of the progressive constitutional turn suppose.176 Rather, Parrish 
ushered the police power into the industrial era by rehabilitating the broad 
authority to regulate in the public interest that state and local lawmakers had 
exercised throughout the 19th century. That rehabilitation, however, required a 
renovated understanding of state neutrality, in which public power is not only an 
agent of coercion, but also a bulwark against the coercion of economic necessity. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Although Richard Epstein disclaims doctrinaire originalism, he nevertheless 
stakes his vision of classical liberal constitutionalism to the authority of history—in 
particular, to the classical liberal worldview of the late-18th century that the 
Founders wove into the constitutional fabric, and that channeled the “historical arc 
of legal evolution” right up until the progressive “revolution” of 1937.177 Indeed, 
The Classical Liberal Constitution’s central argument is that the Constitution is not 
merely open to classical liberal interpretations, but that it “most emphatically [is] a 
classical liberal document”;178 and that fidelity to its true, correct meaning requires 
 
 172. Id. at 57. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. Recall that in Lochner, the majority failed 
to discern any connection between the challenged hours regulation and “the morals, the health or the 
safety of the people.” Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56. 
 173. Id. at 56–57. 
 174. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 
207 (1986). 
 175. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937).  
 176. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 34; EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 135. 
 177. Richard A. Epstein, Rediscovering the Classical Liberal Constitution: A Reply to Professor 
Hovenkamp, 101 IOWA L. REV. 55, 65 (2015). 
 178. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 53. 
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that we read it as such. The obverse of this position, however, is that if the historical 
foundations that Epstein claims for classical liberal constitutionalism turn out to be 
unstable or worse, his normative argument collapses, particularly for readers who 
do not share his political-philosophical commitments to unregulated markets and 
limited government. The other contributors to this forum have very ably 
demonstrated that the Constitution was decidedly not classically liberal in its 
inception. As Professor Purcell pointedly concludes, to the extent that The Classical 
Liberal Constitution purports to be a history of legal and political thought during 
the Founding period, it is a history “designed . . . to confer ‘originalist’ legitimacy 
and authority on Epstein’s contemporary version of libertarian politics and free 
market economics.”179 
This Response has argued that Epstein’s narrative of subsequent classical 
liberal ascendancy—the “long historical run of about 150 years”180—is likewise 
contradicted by the common law vision of public authority and private rights as it 
was understood and practiced by lawmakers and courts. Not only did antebellum 
states and municipalities routinely regulate a wide variety of economic activity, 
intermeddling in myriad ways with ordinary private commercial transaction; to the 
extent that courts did enforced limits on the police power, those limits simply were 
not drawn, as Epstein claims, according to “the rights of life, liberty, and property 
. . . at the core of the natural rights tradition.”181 The municipal officials, state 
legislators, and common law judges who executed the common-law vision of 
statecraft during the pre-Civil War decades would not have recognized the proto 
“fundamental rights” framework that Epstein anachronistically ascribes to that 
period. Further, even the economic liberties jurisprudence of the Lochner era, 
which Epstein celebrates as the culmination of the “classical liberal synthesis,”182 
was remarkably limited in scope, equivocal in principle, and fleeting in time. In 
short, the actual history of economic regulation in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, and the relatively modest limits that courts placed on such 
regulation, offer meager evidence of a classical liberal constitutional tradition. 
 
 
 179. Purcell, supra note 11, at 121; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 40–47; Olken, supra 
note 12, at 102–104. 
 180. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 181. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 13. 
 182. Id. at 339. 
